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4 1. INTRODUCTION
1. INTRODUCTION
The fundamental objective of the combined safety and Reliability assess-
ment is to identify critical items in the design and the choice of equipment
that may jeopardize safety or availability, and thereby to provide arguments
for the selection between different options for the system.
Achieving safety and reliability has been one the prime objectives for system
designers while designing safety critical system for decades. With growing environ-
mental awareness, concerns, and demands, the scope of the design of reliable (and
safe) systems has been enhanced to even small components as sensors and actuators.
In the past, the normal procedure to address the higher demand for reliability was
to add hardware redundancy that in turn increases the production and maintenance
costs. Active fault-tolerant design is an attempt to achieve higher redundancy while
minimizing the costs.
In chapter 2 reliability and safety related issues are considered and described.
The idea of introducing this chapter is to provide an overview of the concepts and
methods used for reliability and safety assessment.
The focus in chapter 3 is on fault-tolerance concept. Type of possible faults in
components and customary methods for applying redundancy is described. Finally,
the chapter is wrapped up by considering and describing the main subject, which is
a formal and consistent procedure to design active fault-tolerant systems.
1.1 Terminology
Definition of the used notations in this report is provided in this section.
Availability: The probability that a system is performing satisfactorily
at time t.
Fault-tolerance: Ability to tolerate and accommodate for a fault with or
without performance degradation.
Fail-operational: The component/unit stays operational after one failure.
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Fail-safe: The component/unit processes directly to a predefined safe
state (actively or passively) after one (or several) fault has
occurred.
Hazard: the presence of any process abnormality which represents
a dangerous or potentially dangerous state.
MTBF: Mean time between failure
MTTR: Mean time to repair
Reliability: is the characteristic of an item expressed by the probabil-
ity that it will perform its required function in the specified
manner over a given time period and under specified and
assumed conditions.
Risk: (normally) refers to the statistical annual frequency of the
particular hazard state. Ex. once per year, or once per
10000 years.
Risk reduction: Reduce the probability of hazardous events
Safety: is freedom from accident or losses.
Safety integrity: is the probability of a safety-related system satisfactorily
performing the required safety functions under all stated
conditions within a stated period of time.
Safety Integrity Level: Average probability of failure to perform its designed func-
tion on demand (SIL).
Potential Hazard states, are most often identified by carrying out hazard and
operational studies known as HAZOPs.
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2. RELIABILITY AND SAFETY
2.1 Reliability
Reliability engineering is concerned primarily with failures and failure rate reduc-
tion. The reliability engineering approach to safety thus concentrate on failures as
cause of accidents. Reliability engineers use a variety of techniques to minimize
component failure (Leveson 1995).
Definition of reliability embraces the clear-cut criterion for failure, from which
we may judge at what point the system is no longer functioning properly.
2.1.1 Basic definitions
Reliability is defined as the probability that a system survives for some specified
period of time. It may be expressed in term of the random t, the time-to-system-
failure. The probability density function (PDF), f(t), has the physical meaning:
f(t)t = Pft < t  t+tg =

Probability that failure takes place
at a time between t and t

(2.1)
for vanishing small t. The cumulative distribution function (CDF), F (t) has now
the following meaning:
F (t) = Pft  tg =

Probability that failure takes place
at a time less than or equal to t

(2.2)
The reliability is defined as:
R(t) = Pft > tg =

Probability that a system operates
without failure for a length of time t

(2.3)
Since a system that does not fail for t  t must fail at some t > t, one get:
R(t) = 1  F (t) (2.4)
or equivalently either
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R(t) = 1 
Z t
0
f(t0)dt0 (2.5)
or
R(t) =
Z
1
t
f(t0)dt0 (2.6)
Following properties are clear:
R(0) = 1 and R(1) = 0 (2.7)
One can see from equation 2.4 that reliability is the complementary cumulative dis-
tribution function (CCDF), that is, R(t) = 1   F (t). Similarly, since F (t) is the
probability that the system will fail before t = t, it is often referred to as the unreli-
ability or failure probability, i.e., F (t) = 1 R(t).
Equation 2.5 may be inverted by differentiation to give the PDF of failure times
in terms of the reliability:
f(t) =  
d
dt
R(t) (2.8)
One can gain insight into failure mechanisms by examining the behavior of the
failure rate. The failure rate, (t), may be defined in terms of the reliability or the
PDF of the time-to-failure as follows. Let (t)t be the probability that the system
will fail at some time t < t+t given that it has not yet failed at time t. Thus it is
the conditional probability
(t)t = Pft < t+tjt > tg: (2.9)
Following the definition of conditional probability we have:
Pft < t+tjt > tg =
Pf(t > t) \ (t < t+t)g
Pft > tg
: (2.10)
The numerator of equation 2.10 is just an alternative way of writing the PDF, i.e.:
Pf(t > t) \ (t < t+t)g  Pft < t < t+tg = f(t)t: (2.11)
The De-numerator of equation 2.10 is just R(t) (see equation 2.3). Therefore, by
combining equations, one obtains:
(t) =
f(t)
R(t)
: (2.12)
This quality, the failure rate, is also referred to as the hazard or mortality rate.
The most used way to express the reliability and the failure PDF is in terms of failure
rate. To do this, we first eliminate f(t) from Eq. 2.12 by inserting Eq. 2.8 to obtain
the failure rate in terms of the reliability,
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(t) =  
1
R(t)
d
dt
R(t): (2.13)
Then by multiplying both side of the equation by dt and integrating between zero
and t, we obtain
Z t
0
(t0)dt0 =   ln[R(t)] (2.14)
since R(0) = 1. The desired expression for reliability can hence be derived by
exponentiating the results
R(t) = exp

 
Z t
0
(t0)dt0

: (2.15)
The probability density function f(t) is obtained by inserting Eq. 2.15 into Eq.
2.12 and solve for f(t):
f(t) = (t) exp

 
Z t
0
(t0)dt0

: (2.16)
The most used parameter to characterize reliability is the mean time to failure or
MTTF. It is just the expected or mean value of Eftg of the failure at time t. Hence
MTTF =
Z
1
0
tf(t)dt: (2.17)
The MTTF may be written directly in terms of the reliability by substituting Eq. 2.8
and integration by parts:
MTTF =  
Z
1
0
t
dR
dt
dt =  tR(t)

1
0
+
Z
1
0
R(t)dt (2.18)
The term tR(t) vanishes at t = 0. Similarly, from Eq. 2.15, we see that R(t) will
decay exponentially, since the failure rate (t) greater than zero. Thus tR(t)  ! 0
as t  !1. Therefore, we have
MTTF =
Z
1
0
R(t)dt (2.19)
2.1.2 Constant failure rate model and the exponential distributions
Random failures that give rise to the constant failure rate model are the most widely
used basis for describing reliability phenomena. They are defined by the assumption
that the rate at which the system fails is independent of its age. For continuously op-
erating systems this implies a constant failure rate.
The constant failure rate model for continuously operating systems leads to an ex-
ponential distribution. Replacing the time dependent failure rate (t) by a constant
 in Eq. 2.16 yields, for the FDP,
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f(t) = e t : (2.20)
Similarly, the CDF becomes
F (t) = 1  e t; (2.21)
and reliability may be written as (see Eq. 2.4)
R(t) = e t : (2.22)
The MTTF and the variance of the failure times are also given in terms of .
From Eq. 2.19 we obtain
MTTF =
1

; (2.23)
and the variance is found to be:
2 = 1=2: (2.24)
2.1.3 Mean time between failure with constant failure rate
In many situations failure does not constitute the end of life. Rather, the system
is immediately replaced or repaired and operation continues. In such situations a
number of new pieces of information become important. We may want to know the
expected number of failures over some specified period of time in order to estimate
the cost of replacement parts. More important, it may be necessary to estimate the
probability that more than a specific number of failures N will occur over a period
of time. Such information allows us to maintain an adequate inventory of repair
parts.
In modeling these situations, one restrict his/her attention to the constant failure
rate approximation. In this the failure rate is often given in terms of the mean time
between failure (MTBF), as opposed to the mean time to failure or MTTF. In fact
they are both the same number if, when a system fails it is assumed to be repaired
immediately to an as-good-as-new condition.
We first consider the times at which the failures take place, and therefore the number
that occur within any given span of the time. Suppose that we let n be a discrete
random variable representing the number of failures that take place between t = 0
and a time t. Let
pn(t) = Pfn = njtg (2.25)
be the probability that exactly n failures have taken place before time t. Clearly, if
we start counting failures at time zero, we must have
p0(0) = 1; (2.26)
pn(0) = 0; n = 0; 1; 2; : : : ;1 (2.27)
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In addition, at any time
1X
n=0
pn(t) = 1: (2.28)
For small t, let failure t be the probability that the (n + 1)th failure will take
place during the time increment between t and t+t, given that exactly n failures
have taken place before time t. Then the probability that no failure will occur during
t is 1  t. From this we see that the probability that no failures have occurred
before t+t my be written as
p0(t+t) = (1  t)p0(t): (2.29)
Then noting that
d
dt
pn(t) = lim
t!0
pn(t+t)  p0(t)
t
(2.30)
we obtain the simple differential equation
d
dt
p0(t) =  p0(t) (2.31)
Using the initial condition, Eq. 2.26, we find
p0(t) = e
 t: (2.32)
With p0(t) determined, we may now solve successively for pn(t); n = 1; 2; 3; : : :
in the following manner.We first observe that if n failures have taken place before
time t, the probability that the (n+1)th failure will take place between t and t+t
is t. Therefore, since this transition probability is independent of the number of
previous failures, we may write
pn(t+t) = t)pn 1(t) + (1  t)pn(t): (2.33)
The last term accounts for the probability that no failure takes place during t. For
sufficiently small t we can ignore the possibility of two or more failures taking
place.
Using the definition of the derivative once again, we may reduce Eq. ?? to the dif-
ferential equation
d
dt
pn(t) =  pn(t) + pn 1(t) (2.34)
with the following solution
etpn(t)  pn(0) = 
Z t
0
pn 1(t
0)et
0
dt0: (2.35)
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But since from Eq. 2.27 pn(0) = 0, we have
pn(t) = e
 t
Z t
0
pn 1(t
0)et
0
dt0: (2.36)
This recursive relationship allows us to calculate the pn successively. For p1, insert
Eq. 2.32 on the right-hand side and carry out the integral to obtain
p1(t) = te
 t (2.37)
and for all n  0 the Eq. 2.36 is satisfied by
p1(t) =
(t)n
n!
e t (2.38)
and these quantities in turn satisfy the initial conditions given by Eqs. 2.26 and
2.27.
The probabilities pn(t) are the same as the Poisson distribution with  = t. Thus
it is possible to determine the mean and the variance of the number n of events
occurring over a time span t. Thus the expected number of failures during time t is
n  Efng = t; (2.39)
and the variance of n is
2n = t: (2.40)
Since pn(t) are the probability mass functions of a discrete variable n, we must
have,
1X
n=0
pn(t) = 1 (2.41)
The number of failures can be related to the mean time between failures by
n =
t
MTBF
(2.42)
This is the expression that relates n and the MTBF assuming a constant failure
rate.
In general, the MTBF may be determined from
MTBF =
t
n
; (2.43)
where n, the number of failures, is large.
The probability that more than N failures have occurred is
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Pfn > Ng =
1X
n=N+1
(t)n
n!
e t: (2.44)
Instead of writing this infinite series, however, we may use Eq. 2.41 to write
Pfn > Ng = 1 
NX
n=0
(t)n
n!
e t: (2.45)
2.2 Safety
While using various techniques are often effective in increasing reliability, they do
not necessarily increase safety. Under some conditions they may even reduce safety.
For example, increasing the burst-pressure to working-pressure ratio of a tank intro-
duces new dangers of an explosion or chemical reaction in the event of a rapture.
Assuming that reliability and safety are synonymous is hence true in special cases.
In general, safety has a broader scope than failures, and failures may not compro-
mise safety. There is obviously an overlap between reliability and safety (Leveson
1995) (figure 2.1); manly accidents may occur without component failure - the indi-
SafetyReliability
Fig. 2.1. Safety and reliability are overlapping, but are not identical.
vidual components where operating exactly as specified or intended, that is, without
failure. The opposite is also true - Components may fail without a resulting accident.
Accidents may be caused by equipment operation outside the parameters and time
limits upon which the reliability analysis are based. Therefore, a system may have
high reliability and still have accidents. Safety is an emergent property that arises at
the system level when components are operating together.
For a safety-related system all aspects of reliability, availability, maintainability,
and safety (RAMS) have to be considered as they are relevant to the responsibility
of manufacturers and the acceptability of the customers. Safety and reliability are
generally achieved by a combination of
I fault prevention
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I fault tolerance
I fault detection and diagnosis
I autonomous supervision and protection
There are two stages for fault prevention: fault avoidance and fault removal.
Fault avoidance and removal has to be accomplished during the design and test
phase.
2.3 Hazard Analysis
Hazard analysis is the essential part of any effective safety program, providing vis-
ibility and coordination (Leveson 1995) (see figure 2.2). Information flows both
Hazard
analysis
Design
Management
Maintenance
Operations Training
QA
Test
Fig. 2.2. Hazard analysis provides visibility and coordination.
outward from and back into the hazard analysis. The outward information can help
designers perform trade studies and eliminate or mitigate hazards and can help qual-
ity assurance identify quality categories, acceptance tests, required inspections, and
components that need special care. Hazard analysis is a necessary step before haz-
ards can be eliminated or controlled through design or operational procedures. Per-
forming this analysis, however, does not ensure safety.
Hazard analysis is performed continuously throughout the life of the system, with
increasing depth and extent as more information is obtained about the system de-
sign. As the project progress, the use of hazard analysis will vary - such as identi-
fying hazards, testing basic assumptions and various scenarios about the system op-
eration, specifying operational and maintenance tasks, planning training programs,
evaluation potential changes, and evaluating the assumptions and foundation of the
models as the system is used and feedback is obtained.
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The various hazard analysis techniques provide formalisms for systematizing knowl-
edge, draw attention to gaps in knowledge, help prevent important consideration
being missed, and aid in reasoning about systems and determining where improve-
ments are most likely to be effective.
The way of choosing the appropriate hazard analysis process depends on the
goals or purposes of the hazard analysis. The goals of safety analysis are related to
three general tasks:
1. Development: the examination of a new system to identify and assess potential
hazards and eliminate or control them.
2. Operational management: the examination of an existing system to identify
and assess hazards in order to improve the level of safety, to formulate a safety
management policy, to train personnel, and to increase motivation for efficiency
and safety of operation.
3. Certification: the examination of a planned or existing system to demonstrate
its level of safety in order to be accepted by the authorities or the public.
The first two tasks have the common goal of making the system safer (by using
appropriate techniques to engineer safer systems), while the third task has the goal
of convincing management or government licenser that an existing design or system
is safe (which is also called risk assessment).
2.3.1 Steps in the Hazard analysis process
A hazard analysis consists of the following steps:
1. Definition of objectives.
2. Definition of scope.
3. Definition and description of the system, system boundaries, and information
to be used in the analysis.
4. Identification of hazards.
5. Collection of data (such as historical data, related standards and codes of prac-
tice, scientific tests and experimental results).
6. Qualitative ranking of hazards based on their potential effects (immediate or
protracted) and perhaps their likelihood (qualitative or quantitative).
7. Identification of caused factors.
8. Identification of preventive or corrective measures and general design criteria
and controls.
9. Evaluation of preventive or corrective measures, including estimates of cost.
Relative cost ranking may be adequate.
10. Verification that controls have been implemented correctly and are effective.
11. Quantification of selected, unresolved hazards, including probability of occur-
rence, economic impact, potential losses, and costs of preventive or corrective
measures.
12. Quantification of residual risk.
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13. Feedback and evaluation of operational experience.
Not all of the steps are needed to be performed for every system and for every
hazard. For new systems designs, usually the first 10 steps are necessary.
2.3.2 System model
Every system analysis requires some type of model of the system, which may
change from a fuzzy idea in the analysts mind to a complex and carefully specified
mathematical model. A model is a representation of a system that can be manipu-
lated in order to obtain information about the system itself. Modeling any system
requires a description of the following:
 Structure: The interrelationship of the parts along some dimension(s), such as
space, time, relative importance, and logic and decision making properties:
 Distinguishing qualities: a qualitative description of the particular variables and
parameters the characterize the system and distinguish it from similar structure.
 Magnitude, probability, and time: a description of the variables and parameters
with the distinguishing qualities in terms of their magnitude or frequency over
time and their degree of certainty for the situations or conditions of interest.
2.3.3 Hazard level
The hazard category or level is characterized by (1) severity (sometimes also called
damage) and (2) likelihood (or frequency) of occurrence. Hazard level is often spec-
ified in form of a hazard criticality index matrix to aid in prioritization as it is shown
in figure 2.3. Hazard criticality index matrix combines hazard severity and hazard
probability/frequency.
Hazard consequence classes/categories. Categorizing the hazard severity reflects
worst possible consequences. Different categories are used depending on the indus-
try or even the used system. Some examples are:
Catastrophic – Critical – Marginal – Negligible
or
Major – Medium – Minor
or simply
Category 1 – Category 2 – Category 3.
Consequence classes can vary from Acceptable to Unacceptable as it is shown in
figure 2.3. Severity of hazard (for a given production plant) is considered with regard
to:
 Environmental damages
 Production line damages
 Lost production
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Frequency of
occurrence
Consequence
class
Major
Medium
Minor
Low Medium High
Unacceptable
high risk
Acceptable
low risk
Fig. 2.3. The hazard level shown in form of hazard criticality index matrix: hazard conse-
quence classes versus frequency of occurrence
 Lost workforce
 Lost company image
 Insurance (premium)
The basis for defining hazard consequence classes is the company policy in general.
Hence, definition of hazard consequence classes are not application specific, i.e.
different companies can define different consequence classes for the same case.
Hazard likelihood/frequency of occurrence. The hazard likelihood of occurrence
can be specified either qualitatively or quantitatively. During the design phase of
a system, due to the lack of detailed information, accurate evaluation of hazard
likelihood is not possible. Qualitative evaluation of likelihood is usually the best
that can be done.
Accepted frequencies of occurrence. The basis for defining accepted frequencies
of occurrence depends on the company policy on the issue. So, the definition of ac-
cepted frequencies of occurrence is not application specific (can vary from company
to company). Examples of ranking of frequencies of occurrence are:
Frequent – Probable – Occasional – Remote – Improbable - Impossible
or
High – Medium – Low
By specifying hazard consequence categories and frequencies of occurrence one can
draw the hazard criticality index matrix as shown in figure 2.3.
Specifying the acceptable Hazard (risk) level is management’s responsibility.
This corresponds to drawing the thick line in the figure. Following issues have im-
pact on how to specify the acceptable risk levels:
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 National regulations
 Application of methods specified in standards,
 Following the best practice applied by major industrial companies,
 By drawing comparison between socially accepted risks (e.g. risk of driving by
car, airplane,...),
 Policy to propagate the company image.
2.4 Hazard analysis models and techniques
There exists various methods for performing hazard analysis, each having different
coverage and validity. Hence, several may be required during the life of the project.
It is important to notice that none of these methods alone is superior to all others for
every objective and even applicable to all type of systems. Furthermore, very little
validation of these techniques has been done. The most used techniques, which are
listed below, are described extensively in (Leveson 1995):
) Checklists,
) Hazard Indices,
) Fault tree analysis (FTA),
) Management Oversight and Risk Tree analysis (MORT),
) Even Tree Analysis (ETA),
) Cause-Consequence Analysis (CCa),
) Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP),
) Interface Analysis,
) Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA),
) Failure Mode Effect, and Critically Analysis (FMEAC),
) Fault Hazard Analysis (FHA),
) State Machine Hazard Analysis,
In this report, FMEA and FMECA are described more in details, as they have been
applied ((Bøgh, Izadi-Zamanabadi, and Blanke 1995)).
2.4.1 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
This technique was developed by reliability engineers to permit them to predict
equipment reliability. This is a hierarchical, bottom-up, inductive analysis tech-
nique, where the initiating events are failures of individual components.
The objectives of FMEA are as follows (Russomanno, Bonnell, and Bowles 1994)
– to provide a systematic examination of potential system failures;
– to analyze the effect of each failure mode on system operation;
– to access the safety of various systems or components, and
– to identify corrective actions or design modifications.
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Identify Indenture
Level
Define Each Item
Define Ground
Rules
Identify Failure
Modes
Determine effect of
Each Item Failure
Classify Failures
Identify Detection
Methods
Identify
Compensation
Fig. 2.4. Major logical steps in the FMEA analysis
The analysis considers the effects of a single item failure on overall system operation
and spans a myriad of applications, including electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, and
software domains. Before the FMEA analysis begins, a thorough understanding of
the system components, their relationships, and failure modes must be determined
and represented in a formalized manner. The indenture level of the analysis (i.e. the
item levels that describe the relative complexity of assembly or function) must coin-
cide with the stage of design. The indenture level progresses from the most general
description; then, properties are added and the indenture level becomes more spe-
cialized. The FMEA must be conducted at multiple indenture level; hence a failure
mode can be identified and traced to the most specialized assembly for ease of repair
or design modification. Figure 2.4 outlines the major logical steps in the analysis.
The possible problems with the application of FMEA (also FMECA) are included
in the following:
1. Engineers have insufficient time for proper analysis
2. Analysts have a poor understanding of FMEA and designers are inadequately
trained in FMEA.
3. FMEA is perceived as a difficult, laborious, and mundane task.
4. FMEA knowledge tends to be restricted to small groups of specialists.
5. Computerized aids are needed to decrease the effort required to produce a
FMEA.
2.4.2 Failure Mode, Effect and Critically Analysis (FMECA)
Failure Mode, Effect and Critically Analysis (FMECA) is basically a FMEA with
more detailed analysis of the criticality of the failure. In this analysis criticalities
or priorities are assigned to failure mode effects. Figure 2.5 shows an example of
tables used in this analysis.
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Failure Modes and Effects Critically Analysis
Subsystem Prepared by Date
Item
Failure
Modes
Cause of Failure
Possible
Effects
Prob. Level
Possible action to Reduce
Failure Rate or Effects
Fig. 2.5. A simple FMECA scheme
2.4.3 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
FTA is primarily a means for analyzing causes of hazards, not identifying hazards.
The top event in the tree must have been foreseen and thus identified by other tech-
niques. FTA is, hence, a top-down search method. Once the tree is constructed, it can
be written as Boolean expression and simplified to show the specific combination
of basic events that are necessary and sufficient to cause the hazardous event.
Fault-tree evaluation by cut sets. The direct evaluation procedures just discussed
allow us to assess fault trees with relatively few branches and basic events. When
larger trees are considered, both evaluation and interpretation of the results become
more difficult and digital computer codes are invariably employed. Such codes are
usually formulated in terms of the minimum cut-set methodology discussed in this
section. There are at least two reasons for this. First, the techniques lend themselves
well to the computer algorithms, and second, from them a good deal of intermediate
information can be obtained concerning the combination of component failures that
are pertinent to improvements in system design and operations.
The discussion that follows is conveniently divided into qualitative and quantitative
analysis. In qualitative analysis information about the logical structure of the tree
is used to locate weak points and evaluate and improve system design. In quantita-
tive analysis the same objectives are taken further by studying the probabilities of
component failures in relation to system design.
Qualitative analysis. In the following the idea of minimum cut-sets is introduced
and then it is related to th qualitative evaluation of of fault trees. We then dis-
cuss briefly how the minimum cut sets are determined for large fault trees. Finally,
we discuss their use in locating system weak points, particularly possibilities for
common-mode failures.
minimum cut-set formulation. A minimum cut set is defined as the smallest com-
bination of primary failures which, if they occur, will cause the top event to occur. It,
therefore, is a combination (i.e. intersection) of primary failures sufficient to cause
the top event. It is the smallest combination in that all the failures must take place
for the top event to occur. If even one of the failures in the minimum cut set does
not happen, the top event will not take place.
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The terms minimum cut set and failure mode are sometimes used interchange-
ably. However, there is a subtle difference that we shall observe hereafter. In reliabil-
ity calculations a failure mode is a combination of component or other failures that
cause the system to fail, regardless of the consequences of the failure. A minimum
cut set is usally more restrictive, for it is the minimum combination of failures that
causes the top event as defined for a particular fault tree. If the top event is defined
broadly as system failure, the two are indeed interchangeable. Usually, however, the
top event encompasses only the particular subset of system failures that bring about
a particular safety hazard.
B C A B
C E4A E3
E1 E2
T
Fig. 2.6. Example of a fault tree
The origin for using the term cut set may be illustrated graphically using the re-
duced fault tree in Fig. 2.7. The reliability block diagram corresponding to the tree
is shown in Fig. 2.6. The idea of a cut set comes originally from the use of such
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A
B
C
Fig. 2.7. Minimum cut-sets on a reliability block diagram.
diagrams for electric apparatus, where the signal enters at the left and leaves at the
right. Thus the minimum cut set is the minimum number of components that must
be cut to prevent the signal flow. There are two minimum cut sets, M 1 consisting of
componentsA and B, and M2, consisting of component C.
a1
a2
b1
a3
a4
b2
c
Fig. 2.8. Minimum cut-sets on a reliability block diagram of a seven component system.
Practice: Find the minimum cut sets in Fig. 2.8.
For larger systems, particularly those in which the primary failures appear more
than once in the fault tree, the simple geometrical interpretation becomes problem-
atical. However, the primary characteristics of the concept remain valid. It permits
the logical structure of the fault tree to be presented in a systematic way that is
amenable to interpretation in terms of the behavior of the minimum cut-sets.
Suppose that the minimum cut sets of a system can be found. The top event,
system failure, may then be expressed as the union of these sets, Thus if there are
N minimum cut sets,
T =M1 [M2 [    [MN : (2.46)
Each minimum cut set then consists of the intersection of the minimum number of
primary failures required to cause the top event. For example, the minimum cut sets
for the system shown in Fig. 2.8 are
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M1 = c M3 = a1 \ a2 \ b2
M2 = b1 \ b2 M4 = a3 \ a4 \ b1 (2.47)
M5 = a1 \ a2 \ a3 \ a4:
Before proceeding, it should be pointed out that there are other cut sets that
will cause the top event, but they are not minimum cut sets. These need not be
considered, however, because they do not enter the logic of the fault tree. By the
rules of Boolean algebra they are absorbed into the minimum cut sets.
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
T
X11 X21 X31 X41 X51 X61
Fig. 2.9. Generalized Minimum cut-set representation of a fault tree.
Since we are able to write the top event in terms of minimum cut sets as in Eq.
2.46, we may express the fault tree in the standardized form shown in Fig. 2.9. In
this Xmn is the nth element of the mth minimum cut set. Not that the same primary
failures may often be expected to occur in more than one of the minimum cut sets.
Thus the minimum cut sets are not generally independent of one another.
Cut-Set Interpretations. Knowing the minimum cut sets for a particular fault tree
can provide valuable insight concerning potential weak points of complex systems,
even when it is not possible to calculate the probability that either a particular cut
set or the top event will occur. Three qualitative considerations, in particular, may
be useful:
– the ranking of the minimal cut sets by the number of primary failures required
– the importance of particular component failures to the occurrence of the minimum
cut sets, and
– the susceptibility of the particular cut sets to common-mode failures.
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Minimum cut sets are normally categorized as singlets, doublets, triplets, and so on,
according to the number of primary failures in the cut set. Emphasis is then put on
eliminating the cut sets corresponding to small number of failures, for ordinarily
these may be expected to make the largest contributions to system failure.
The common design criterion that no single component failure should cause
system failure is equivalent to saying that all singlets must be removed from the
fault tree for which the top event is system failure. Indeed, if component failure
probabilities are small and independent, then provided that they are of same order
of magnitude, doublets will occur much less frequently than singlets, triplets much
less than doublets, and so on.
A second application of cut-set information is in assessing qualitatively the im-
portance of a particular component. Suppose that we wish to evaluate the effect on
the system of improving the reliability of a particular component, or conversely, to
ask whether, if a particular component fails, the system-wide effect will be consid-
erable. If the component appears in one or more of the lower order cut-sets, say
singlets or doublets, its reliability is likely to have a pronounced effect. On the other
hand, if it appears only in minimum cut-sets requiring several independent failures,
its importance to system failure is likely to be small.
These arguments can rank minimum cut-set and component importance, as-
suming that the primary failures are independent. If they are not, that is, if they
are susceptible to common-mode failure, the ranking of cut-set importance may be
changed. If five of the failures in a minimum cut-set with six failures, for example,
can occur as the result of a common cause, the probability of the cut-set’s occurring
is more comparable to that of a doublet.
Extensive analysis is often carried out to determine the susceptibility of min-
imum cut-sets to common-cause failures. In an industrial plant one cause might
be fire. If the plant is divided into several fire-resistant compartments, the analysis
might proceed as follows. All the primary failures of equipment located in one of the
compartments that could be caused by fire are listed. Then these components would
be eliminated from the minimum cut-sets (i.e. they would be assumed to fail). The
resulting cut-sets would then indicate how many failures- if any- in addition to those
caused by the fire, would be required for the top event to happen. Such analysis is
critical for determining the layout of the plant that will best protect it from a variety
of sources of damage: fire, flooding, collision, earthquake, and so on.
2.4.4 Risk
A more detailed definition of risk is given in the following (Leveson 1995):
Risk is the hazard level combined with (1) the likelihood of the hazard
leading to an accident (sometimes called danger) and (2) hazard exposure
and duration (sometimes called latency).
Exposure or duration of a hazard is a component of risk: Since an accident involves
a coincidence of conditions, of which the hazard is just one, the longer the hazardous
state exists, the greater the chance that the other prerequisite conditions will occur.
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The terms risk analysis and hazard analysis are sometimes used interchangeably,
but an important distinction exists. Hazard analysis involves only the identification
of hazards and the assessment of hazard level, while risk analysis adds the iden-
tification and assessment of the environmental conditions along with exposure or
duration. Thus, hazard analysis is a subset of risk analysis.
Risk Reduction. Dangerous failures can undergo risk classification in order to de-
termine their required safety integrity level and to decide whether risk reduction is
necessary. To categorize risk reduction level, the term Safety Integrity Levels (SIL)
have been defined, which allocate risk reduction factors to four predefined safety
levels SIL1 – SIL4. The Safety Integrity Level is hence a measure for applying su-
pervision and safety methods to reduce the risk. An example for the relation between
safety integrity level and risk reduction factor (RRF) is illustrated in the following
table:
Safety Integrity Level Safety Availability Required Equivalent RRF
4 > 99:99% > 10000
3 99:9  99:99% 1000   10000
2 99  99:9% 100   1000
1 90  99% 10  100
Table 2.1. Safety Integrity Level vs. Risk Reduction Factor
In order to determine the safety integrity level following factors/parameters are
used:
C: Consequence risk parameter
F: Frequency and exposure risk parameter
P: Possibility of avoiding risk parameter
W: Probability of unwanted occurrence
and SIL is computed as:
SIL = C  F  P W
An example of categorization of these parameters is given below:
C0: Slight damage to equipment
C1: One injury
C2: One death
C3: Several deaths
F1: Small probability of persons present in the dangerous zone
F2: High probability of persons present in the dangerous zone
P1: Good chance to avoid the hazard
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P2: Highly impossible to avoid the hazard
W1: Probability of hazardous event very small (Frequency of occurrence)
W2: Probability of hazardous event small
W3: Probability of hazardous event high
Risk graph. The safety integrity level can be computed by using the risk graph as it
is shown in Figure 2.10.
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C2
C3
C4
F1
F2
F1
F2
P1
P2
P1
P2
W3 W2 W1
Risk calculation graph
Fig. 2.10. A risk graph that is used to determine related safety integrity level. a : acceptable,
na: not acceptable.
Example 1- Hazard A:.
– Hazard with probably a causality (C2),
– Large probability of persons present (F2), assume %90.
– No possibility to avoid the hazard (P2), assume %100.
– Frequency of occurrence, assume once per 10 years, (W2).
Calculations:
– C2*F2*P2*W2 = 1*0.9*1*0.1 = 0.09, or 9 causalities per 100 years
– Required protection SIL 2.
Example 2 - Hazard B:.
– Hazard with probably several causalities, assume 5 causalities, (C3)
– Small probability of persons present (F1), assume %10.
– Frequency of occurrence, assume once per 10 years, (W2).
Calculations:
– C2*F1*W2 = 5*0.10*0.1 = 0.05, or 5 causalities per 100 years
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– Required protection SIL 3.
For each SIL one should determine the required safety measures (preventive or
corrective) in advance. The unavoidable failures must be covered by maintenance
and on-line supervision and safety methods during operation, including protection
and supervision with fault detection and diagnosis and appropriate safety actions.
2.5 Reliability and safety assessment - an overview
In the following two subsections the procedural steps used/needed to carry out relia-
bility and safety assessments are summarized. A more detailed review can be found
in (Bøgh 2000).
2.5.1 Reliability Assessment
Purpose: To analyze potential component failures and operator errors and thereby
to predict the availability of equipments in different operational modes.
2.5.2 Steps in reliability assessment
– Qualitative reliability assessment:
– Preliminary RAM evaluation
– Quantitative reliability assessment
– Structural analysis
– Operational analysis
– Failure consequence analysis
– Reliability calculation
– RAM assessment
2.5.3 Safety Assessment
Purpose: To identify potential hazards and evaluate the risk of accidents associated
with each hazard.
2.5.4 Steps in safety assessments
– Functional analysis
– Functional modeling
– Functional failure analysis
– Hazard analysis
– Hazard identification
– Frequency identification (risk estimation)
– Severity identification
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– Hazard screening and risk ranking
– Risk assessment
– Frequency analysis
– Consequence analysis
– Risk assessment based on the evaluated severity.
28 3. ACTIVE FAULT-TOLERANT SYSTEM DESIGN
3. ACTIVE FAULT-TOLERANT SYSTEM DESIGN
3.1 Introduction
Fault-tolerant methods aim at minimizing the frequency of fault occurrence (W ).
The challenge that faces the engineers is to design mass-produced fault-tolerant sen-
sors, actuators, micro-computers, and bus communication systems with hard real-
time requirements with reasonable costs. In the following fault-tolerant design at
component and unit level (Isermann, Schwarz, and Stölzl 2000) is discussed. The
reliability degree of two most used hardware redundancies, namely cold and hot
standby, is considered. In the last section of this chapter, the main issue which is a
consistent and formal procedure to design an active fault tolerant (control) system
is introduced.
3.2 Type of faults
The starting point for fault-tolerant design is knowledge about the possible faults
that may occur in a unit/component. Type of fault characterizes the behavior for
various components. They may be distinguished by their form, time and extent.
The form can be either systematic or random.
The time behavior may be described by permanent, transient, intermittent, noise, or
drift (see fig. 3.1).
The extent of faults is either local or global and includes the size. Electronic hard-
permanent t
f
transient intermittent noise drift
Fig. 3.1. Time behavior of fault types
ware exhibit systematic faults if they originate from mistakes that have been made
during specification or design phase. During the operation, the faults in electronic
hardware components are mostly random with various type of time behavior.
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The faults in software (bugs) are usually systematic, due to wrong specifications,
coding, logic, calculation overflow, etc. Generally, they are not random like faults in
the hardware.
Failures in mechanical systems can be classified into the following failure mech-
anism: distortion (buckling, deformation), fatigue and fracture (cycle fatigue, ther-
mal fatigue), wear (abrasive, adhesive, caviation), or corrosion (galvanic, chemical,
biological). They may appear as drift like changes (wear, corrosion), or abruptly
(distortion, fracture) at any time or after stress.
Electrical systems consist normally of large number of components with various
failure modes, like short cuts, parameter changes, loose or broken connections, EMC
problems, etc. Generally electrical faults appear more randomly that mechanical
faults.
3.3 Hardware fault-tolerance
Fault tolerance methods use mainly redundancy, which means that in addition to
the used component, additional modules/components are connected. The redundant
modules are either identical or diverse. Such redundancy can be materialized for
hardware, software, information processing, mechanical and electronic components
such as sensors, actuators, microcomputers, buses, power supplies, etc.
There exists mainly two basic approaches for realization of fault tolerance: Static
redundancy and dynamic redundancy.
In static redundancy scheme, the idea is to use three or more modules which
have the same input signals and all are active as it is shown in figure 3.2 a). Their
outputs are connected to a voter that compares these signals. The correct signals
then are chosen by majority voting. For instance, when a triple modular redundant
system is used, the fault in one of the modules generate wrong outputs. The faulty
module can be masked by 2-out-of-3 voting. This scheme can thus handle (tolerate)
one fault. Generally speaking, n (n odd) modules can tolerate (n  1)=2 faults.
Dynamic redundancy uses less number of modules on cost of more information
processing. A minimal configuration uses 2 modules as it is illustrated in figures 3.2
b) and 3.2 c). One module is usually in operation and if it fails the standby or backup
unit takes over. This requires a fault detection unit to detect the faulty situations.
Simple fault detection modules use the output signal for consistency checking (range
check, slew rate check, RMS check), comparison with redundant modules or use of
information redundancy in computers like parity checking or watchdog timers. The
task of the reconfiguration module is to switch to the standby module from the faulty
one after the fault is detected.
In “hot standby” arrangement, shown in figure 3.2 b), both modules are oper-
ating continuously. The transfer time is short, but the price is the operational aging
(wear out) of the standby module.
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Fig. 3.2. Fault-tolerant schemes for electronic hardwares a) Static redundancy b) Dynamic
redundancy (hot standby) c) Dynamic redundancy (cold standby)
In “cold standby” arrangement, shown in figure 3.2 c), the standby module is out
of function and hence does not wear. In this arrangement two more switches at the
input are needed and more transfer time is needed due to the start-up procedure. For
both hot and cold standby schemes, the performance of the fault detection module
is essential.
For digital computers (microcomputers) with only a requirement for fail-safe
behavior, a duplex configuration like figure 3.3 can be applied. The output signals
of two synchronized processors are compared in two comparators (software) which
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act on two switches of one of the outputs. The purpose of this configuration is to
bring the system in fail-safe state (Used in ABS braking systems).
1
2
Comparator
1
xi
x0
Comparator
2
1 2Microprocessor 1
Microprocessor 2
syn-
chron.
Fig. 3.3. Duplex computer system with dynamic redundancy in hot standby, fault detection
with comparators, switch to possible fail-safe (not fault-tolerant)
. .
3.3.1 Mechanical and Electrical systems
For mechanical systems static redundancy is very often used in all kinds of homoge-
neous and inhomogeneous materials (e.g. metals and fibers) and special mechanical
constructions like lattic structures, spoke-wheels, dual tires. Since the inputs and
outputs are not signals but rather, forces, electrical current, or energy flows, the
voter does not exists as it is shown in Figure 3.4. In case of failure in a compo-
nent, the others automatically take over a higher force or current (called stressful
degradation).
For electronic systems static redundancy is materialized in components in form
of multiple wiring, multiple coil windings, multiple brushes for DC motors, or mul-
tiple contacts for potentiometers.
Mechanical and electronic systems with dynamic redundancycan also be built
(see Figure 3.2 c)). Fault detection can be based on measured outputs. To improve
the quality of fault diagnosis one should be able to measure inputs and other inter-
mediate signals. Dynamic redundancy is normally applied for electro-mechanical
systems.
3.4 Reliability considerations for standby configurations
Hot and cold standby configuration is also known as active parallel and standby
parallel in reliability related literatures. To highlight the differences again, it should
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Fig. 3.4. Static redundancy for mechanical (and electrical) systems
. .
be mention that in two-unit hot standby (or active parallel) configuration both units
are employed and therefore subject to failure from the onset of operation. In cold
standby (or standby parallel) configuration the second unit is not brought into the
operation until the first fails, and therefore can not fail until a later time. In the
following the reliabilities for the idealized configurations are derived. Similar con-
siderations also arise in treating multiple redundancy with three or more parallel
units, but will not be considered here.
– Hot standby or active parallel configuration
The reliability Rh(t) of a two-unit hot standby system is the probability that ei-
ther unit 1 or unit 2 will not fail until a time greater than t. Designating random
variables t1 and t2 to represent the failure times we have
Rh(t) = Pft1 > t [ t2 > tg: (3.1)
This yields
Rh(t) = Pft1 > tg+ Pft2 > tg   Pft1 > t \ t2 > tg: (3.2)
Assuming that the failures in the units can occur independently from each other
one can replace the last term in Eq. 3.2 by Pft1 > tgPft2 > tg. Denoting the
reliabilities of the units as
Ri(t) = Pfti > tg; (3.3)
we may then write
Rh(t) = R1(t) +R2(t) R1(t)R2(t) : (3.4)
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– Cold standby or standby parallel configuration
In this case the failure time t2 of the standby unit is dependent on the failure time
t1 of the primary unit. Only the second unit must survive to time t for the system
to survive, but with the condition that it can not fail until after the fist unit fails.
Hence
Rc(t) = Pft2 > t j t2 > t1g: (3.5)
There are two possibilities. Either the first unit doesn’t fail, i.e. t1 > t, or the
first unit fails and the standby unit doesn’t, i.e. t1 < t \ t2 > t. Since these to
possibilities are mutually exclusive, we my just add the possibilities,
Rc(t) = Pft1 > tg+ Pft1 < t \ t2 > tg: (3.6)
The first term is justR1(t), the reliability of the primary unit. The second term has
the following interpretation. Suppose that the PDF for the primary unit is f 1(t).
Then the probability of unit 1 failing between t 0 and t0 + dt0 is f1(t0)dt0. Since
the standby unit is put into operation at t 0, the probability that it will survive to
time t is R2(t   t0). Thus the system reliability, given that the first failure takes
place between t0 and t0 + dt0 is R2(t  t0)f1(t0)dt0. To obtain the second term in
Eq. 3.6 we integrate primary failure time t 0 between zero and t:
Pft1 < t \ t2 > tg =
Z t
0
R2(t  t
0)f1(t
0)dt0:
The standby system reliability then becomes
Rc(t) = R1(t) +
Z t
0
R2(t  t
0)f1(t
0)dt0; (3.7)
or using Eq. 2.8 to express PDF in terms of reliability we obtain
Rc(t) = R1(t) +
Z t
0
R2(t  t
0)
d
dt0
R(t0)dt0 : (3.8)
– Constant failure rate models
Assume that the units are identical, each with a failure rate . Equation 2.22,
R(t) = exp( t), may then be inserted to obtain
Rh(t) = 2e
 t   e 2t (3.9)
for hot standby (active parallel), and
Rc(t) = (1 + t)e
 t (3.10)
for cold standby (standby parallel).
The system failure rate can be determined for each of these cases using Eq. 2.13.
For the active system we have
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h(t) =  
1
Rh(t)
d
dt
Rh(t) = 

1  e t
1  0:5e t

; (3.11)
while for the cold standby system
c(t) =  
1
Rc(t)
d
dt
Rc(t) = 

t
1 + t

: (3.12)
Two traditional measures are useful in assessing the increased reliability that re-
sults from redundant configurations. These are the mean-time-to-failure or MTTF
and the rare event estimate for reliability at times which are small compared to
the MTTF of single units. The values of the MTTF for hot and cold standby of
two identical units are obtained by substituting Eqs. 3.9 and 3.10 into Eq. 2.19.
We have
MTTFh =
3
2
MTTF ; (3.13)
and
MTTFc = 2MTTF ; (3.14)
where MTTF = 1= for each of the two units. Thus, THERE IS A GREATER GAIN
IN MTTF FOR THE COLD STANDBY THAN FOR THE HOT STANDBY SYSTEM.
Frequently, the reliability is of most interest for times that are small compared to
the MTTF, since it is within the small-time domain where the design life of most
products fall. If the single unit reliability, R(t) = exp( t), is expanded in a
power series of t, we have
R(t) = 1  t+
1
2
(t)2  
1
6
(t)3 +    (3.15)
The rare event approximation has the form of one minus the leading term in t.
Thus
R(t)  1  t; t 1 (3.16)
for a single unit. employing the same exponential expansion for the redundant
configurations we obtain
Rh(t)  1  (t)
2; t 1 (3.17)
from Eq. 3.9 and
Rc(t)  1 
1
2
(t)2; t 1 (3.18)
from Eq. 3.10. Hence, FOR SHORT TIMES THE FAILURE PROBABILITY, 1   R,
FOR A COLD STANDBY SYSTEM IS ONLY ONE-HALF OF THAT FOR A HOT
STANDBY SYSTEM.
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3.5 Software fault-tolerance
A software system provides services. So, one can classify the a system’s failure
modes according to the impact that they have on the services it delivers. Two general
domains of failure can be identified:
– Value failure - The values associated with the services is in error (constraint error
- value error).
– Time failure - the services is delivered in wrong time (too early - too late - in-
finitely late (omission failure)).
These failures are depicted in figure 3.5. Combinations of value and timing failures
are often called arbitrary.
Failure mode
Value domain Timing domain Arbitrary
(Fail uncontrolled)
Constraint
error
Value
error
Early Omission Late
Fail silent Fail stoped Fail controlled
Fig. 3.5. Software failure mode classification.
As in its hardware counterpart redundancy methods also is used in software.
Static redundancy is normally achieved through N-version programming, which is
based on the assumptions that a program can be completely, consistently, and unam-
biguously specified, and that programs that have been developed independently will
fail independently. N-version programming (often called design diversity) is defined
as the independent generation ofN (N  2) functionally equivalent programs from
the same initial specifications. The idea is that N individuals or groups produce the
required N versions without interaction. The programs execute concurrently with
the same inputs and their results are compared by a driver process. The correct re-
sult is then chosen be consensus (voting).
Dynamic redundancy in software manifest itself in form of cold standby scheme,
where the redundant component takes over when an error has been detected. There
are four steps in software dynamic redundancy:
1. Error detection: with following techniques:
– Environmental detection: the errors are detected in the environment in which
the program executes.
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– Application detection: These errors are detected by application itself. There
exists several techniques such as: Replication checks, Timing checks, Coding
checks, Reversal checks, etc.
2. Damage confinement and assessment: which is also called error diagnosis.
Damage confinement is concerned with structuring the system in order to min-
imize the damage caused by the faulty component. It is also known as fire-
walling.
3. Error recovery: Aims at transforming the corrupted system into a state from
which it can continue its normal operation (Degraded functionality is allowed).
4. Fault treatment and continued service: Is the maintenance part and aims at find-
ing the occurred fault.
The subject of software fault-tolerance is too extensive to be handled in this note. In-
terested readers can refer to many available references such as (Burns and Wellings
1997), (Mullender 1993) and references therein.
3.6 Active fault-tolerant control system design
The purpose of using fault-tolerant control system is nicely formulated by Stengel
((Stengel 1993)):
Failure- (fault-) tolerance may be called upon to improve system re-
liability, maintainability and survivability. The requirements for fault-
tolerance are different in these three cases. Reliability deals with the
ability to complete the task satisfactorily and with a period of time over
which the ability is retained. A control system that allows normal com-
pletion of tasks after component fault improves reliability. Maintain-
ability concerns the need for repair and the ease with which repairs
can be made, with no premium place on performance. Fault-tolerance
could increase time between maintenance actions and allow the use
of simpler repair procedures. Survivability relates to the likelihood of
conducting the operation safely (without danger to the human opera-
tor of the controlled system), whether or not the task is completed. De-
graded performance following a fault is permitted as long as the system
is brought to an acceptable state.
Faults that can not be avoided must be tolerated (or compensated for) in a way that
the system functionality remains intact (degraded level allowed).
3.6.1 Justification for applying fault-tolerance
The main purpose of applying fault-tolerance is to achieve RAM (Reliability, Avail-
ability, and Maintainability) under a combination of the following constraints:
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! Cost - There is a trade-off between the cost of the preventive maintenance
and the saved money from the decreased number of failures. The failure costs
would need to include, of course, both those incurred in repairing or replacing
the component/subsystem, and those from the loss of production during the un-
scheduled down-time for repair.
The trade-off decision is heavily dependent on the severity level of the failure
consequences, i.e. the risk level; For an aircraft engine the potentially disas-
trous consequences of engine failure would eliminate repair maintenance as a
primary consideration. Concern would be with how much preventive mainte-
nance can be afforded and with the possibility of failures induced by faculty
maintenance. The same argument can be used for production lines in heavy,
petrochemical, chemical, etc. industries, where failure consequences can have
major impact on surrounding environment and/or population.
For mass-produced components/systems such as, motors, pumps, frequency
converters, PLC’s, cars, etc., the added engineering costs for development and
employment of active fault-tolerance will be insignificant, when is calculated
per produced unit. Employing self-diagnosis possibilities on component level
results in producing “intelligent” components (sensors and actuators).
! spatial and weight - In many systems, specially vehicles (space, naval, aerial,
or on road), the limited available space simply prevents adding additional hard-
ware redundancy to the system. For a satellite or a spacecraft, adding additional
hardware redundancy means extra payload (weight and space), which in turn
adds to the manufacturing and transportation costs (if even possible).
! Possibility of doing test - In many systems, for instance those used in heavy,
chemical, or space industries, performing reliability test is either costly and dif-
ficult or simply impossible. Applying active fault-tolerance will greatly improve
the ability to circumvent the system-down situations by detecting and handling
faults or predicting the forthcoming faults.
Beyond the abovementioned arguments that are used in many industrial/production
entities to justify usage of active fault-tolerance, one should mention the very im-
portant “reputation” or “image” factor; the companies that have the reputation of
delivering reliable systems are the ones that are in leading market positions.
3.6.2 A procedure for designing active fault-tolerant (control) systems
In order to design a fault-tolerant control system one needs to apply a certain num-
ber of activities. These are depicted in Figure 3.6 and categorized in the following
steps:
1. Objectives and scope definition: The main activities in this step include estab-
lishing:
– the functional goal of the system (concept definition).
– system structure (type of components and their physical placement).
– possible damages to environment/ production/ staff (life); this includes iden-
tifying environments within which the system operates.
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Objective and
scope definition
Hazard Identification
and assessment
Risk reduction measures
Detailed supervisor
design
- System objectives/goals
- System structure
- Safety/relability scopes
- Desired safety integrity levels
- Fault model (FMEA)
- Fault propagation (FPA)
- Severity level (SIL)
- Analysis of causes (FTA)
- (Analysis of events (ETA))
- System’s information analysis
(Structural analysis)
- Fault diagnosis strategies
- Fault handling strategies
- Consistent logic design
Cost-benefit calculation - Cost-benefit calculation
Fig. 3.6. Required steps for designing fault-tolerant control system
– acceptable level of system safety (fail safe / fail operational/ or else). Safety
(and reliability) related requirements are hence specified.
2. Hazard identification and assessment: This step involves following activities:
– Apply FMEA on the component/unit level to identify the possible faults. A
fault model for each component is constructed.
– Apply Fault propagation analysis (FPA) (see (Bøgh 1997)) to establish the
end-effects of different components faults at the system level.
– Apply Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to identify the faulty components that cause
the end-effects with high severity degree. Carrying out this activity produces
a list of faults that needs to be handled.
Notice 1. FTA and FMEA are not replacement for each other, but rather
complementary steps.
Notice 2:. One can furthermore perform Event Tree Analysis (ETA) in order
to identify the outcome of the hazards.
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– Establish the severity degree of each end-effect at the system level. Since
severity level has direct relation with system integrity level (SIL), one can
employ risk graph (see section 2.3). To perform this activity one needs to
use an appropriate system model; simulation of a fault in a system model will
illustrate the end-effects at the system level and show how the system will
react in the specified environment.
3. Risk reduction measures: This step concerns activities that are needed to be
carried out in order to meet the reliability (and safety) objectives. The pur-
pose at this step is to take the necessary steps to address the faults obtained
from previous step through employment of redundancy (hardware and/or soft-
ware). To minimize the number of redundant components and hence to reduce
the cost, one can analyze the system to obtain knowledge about the existing
inherent information within the system. This information can be used to per-
form fault diagnosis and fault handling. In this case a system model is needed.
System model can be analyzed differently depending on the available knowl-
edge about the system. Structural analysis method (Izadi-Zamanabadi 1999),
(Staroswiecki and Declerck 1989) is a method that, based on the available infor-
mation, provides the designer with a realistic assessment about the possibilities
to detect different faults.
4. Cost-benefit analysis is a natural step in order to determine whether the con-
tinuation of the procedure to the next step is justifiable. Adding hardware re-
dundancy (if possible) may prove cheaper than added cost due to engineering
work related to the detailed design, implementation, and verification in the next
step.
5. Detailed design of supervision level: When redundancy (particularly software
redundancy) is applied in the system, one needs to:
– carry out detailed analysis of the redundant information in order to de-
velop/use appropriate fault diagnosis (i.e. fault detection and isolation) al-
gorithms.
– determine strategies for where and how to stop propagation of severe faults.
– design consistent and correct logic (i.e. the intelligent part of the supervisor)
to carry out decided fault handling strategies.
This is an iterative procedure; during detailed design one may discover that a severe
fault can not be detected (and hence handled) with the existing system structure.
there are two options for the case, either the specified reliability (and safety) re-
quirements are relaxed or additional instrumentation are used. Choosing the second
option requires going through the whole procedure again.
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